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Abstract
The apathy for electoral and political participation in Latin America shows an increasing
trend that deserves the scholar community's attention. In this sense, this paper models the
voter registration decision in a mandatory voting system that includes the margin of victory as
a potential motivator of voter enrollment. The empirical test is focused on the Biobio region,
Chile, during the period 2003-2011. The results indicate that voter enrollment is negatively
inuenced by the margin of victory only if the model is separately regressed for presidential
and mayoral elections. Marginal eects from W2LT regressions are lower in mayoral than in
presidential elections, which indicates that the electorate participates depending on what is the
political oce in question. The citizen participation and racial eects are larger for men than
women, which could reorient the design of public policy aimed to encourage the civic involve-
ment of male indigenous population. Finally, the discrepancy between the W2LT results from
two distant periods suggests a structural change in the Biobio's electorate during the last decade.
Keywords | electoral participation, margin of victory, random eects Tobit model, voting be-
havior, Latin America, Chile
JEL classication | C24, D72, O10
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1 Introduction
The voting behavior literature is based on the pioneer work of Anthony Downs in 1957 and Gor-
don Tullock in 1967 (cited by Barzel & Silberberg, 1973), but it was mainly developed in the
1970s. During this decade, the eorts were focused not only to giving theoretical support to elec-
toral involvement from the economic rationality perspective (Frey, 1971; Barzel & Silberberg, 1973;
Tollison & Willett, 1973; Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1974; May & Martin, 1975), but also to identify the
relevance of social and economics variables over voter participation (Silberman & Durden, 1975;
Tollison et al., 1975; Settle & Abrams, 1976).
Stigler (1972) introduced the concept of political competition in order to model the political
parties' behavior regarding to the attraction of new voters. Therefore, the margin of victory became
into a plausible explanation to parties and voters behavior.
Thenceforth, the vast evidence about the margin of victory eect, also known as Downsian close-
ness eect, has not been conclusive. The ecological fallacy critique stated by Matsusaka & Palda
(1993) called into question the previous evidence obtained from aggregated data. Nevertheless,
the presence of the ecological fallacy in macro-level estimates had already been highlighted by
Lichtman (1974) and Kramer (1983). Both authors demonstrated that macro-level regressions
exhibit more suitable properties than individual survey estimates, specially when the aggregated
model is well-specied.
[Figure 1 about here.]
On the other hand, low turnout around the globe had been a continuous concern for politicians
and academic community. In this sense, in the United States this situation had motivated several
private and government eorts in order to increase the voter turnout, mainly in American youth.
For instance, in 1993, during the Bill Clinton administration, was promulgated the National voter
registration Act that aimed to facilitate the voter enrollment process. And Rock the vote, an Amer-
ican non-prot organization founded in the 1990s, had encouraged the youth electoral participation
through a diverse range of cultural and musical activities. However, in the election of November
2010 just 21% of citizens ages 18 to 24 cast their ballot (Brandon, 2012).
The voter participation in Chile shows a disturbing downward trend in the last decade, specially
in youth vote where the real income and citizen participation rate have played a remarkable role in
this behavior (Toro, 2007; Corvalan & Cox, 2013; Acu~na, 2013b). This situation has increased dra-
matically after the approval of the act that introduced automatic voter registration and voluntary
voting. In fact, in the 2012 Mayor and Councils election the abstention rate rose the sixty percent,
which may constitute an increasing threat to the legitimacy of Chilean democracy in the future.
Before the Chilean voting rule was modied, the Biobio region concentrated in 2011 the 13% of
the electorate, which ranked second only to Metropolitana region with a similar pattern. Indeed,
the voter enrollment rate in the Biobio region had fallen from 83.3% in 2000 to 70.8% in 2011.
This pattern is more accentuated in the male electorate that has lost 14-percentage points over the
same period (see gure 1).
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Inside the Biobio region, the lowest enrollment rates in 2011 were reported in those municipali-
ties linked to urban centers, such as Chiguayante (39.8%), Chillan Viejo (57%), San Pedro de la Paz
(58%), and Los Angeles (59.4%). Figure 2 shows the change experienced by the voter registration
rate between 2000 and 2011 in each municipality that made up this Chilean region.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Based on the above, the behavior of the Chilean electoral roll, particularly the Biobio region,
constitutes an interesting case to explore from the economic rationality perspective. Hence, this
paper propose an extension to the model stated by Acu~na (2013a) where the voter enrollment deci-
sion is made in a society that treats democracy as a public good. In addition, this paper empirically
tests the extended model in order to show new evidence regarding to two voting motivators: margin
of victory and opportunity-cost of time.
2 Material and methods
2.1 The theoretical model
The following model constitutes an extension to that proposed by Acu~na (2013a) in order to include
the margin of victory as a potential motivator of voter enrollment.
Suppose that a democratic society with a binomial political system is populated by n citizens,
whom have preferences for a consumption good, xi, which price is given by px. The voting rule in
this society consists in voluntary voter enrollment but mandatory voting.
The available time can be allocated as follows, each citizen (or individual) can allocate a fraction
hi to work in the labor market and earn a nominal wage, w, and a fraction li to enjoy leisure in
the form of activities linked to citizen participation, whose are costless. Thus, the time constraint
is: li + hi = 1.
On the other hand, each individual values democratic institutions or democratic principles
(i.e., democracy itself) that prevail in the society, which can be represented by the variable d.
In addition, each citizen express (or feel) sympathy for a particular political party in a binomial
political system: the right-wing party A or the left-wing party B. Thus, before each citizen makes
a decision regarding to his/her voter enrollment status, he or she observes the previous electoral
outcome in which party A (B) has a margin of victory over party B (A). Therefore, the utility
function for citizen i, who is a party j's partisan, is given by:
(1) uji (x
j
i ; l
j
i ; d;m 1)
Where u() is a continuous, increasing, and at least twice dierentiable function in x, l, d, and
m 1; j = A;B; i = 1; 2; : : : ; nj ; and n = nA + nB.
Under this democratic context, each citizen must decide whether being or not part of civic life
through voter enrollment, which decision is represented by the variable ri. If the individual decides
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to be enrolled in the voter register (i.e., ri = 1), then he (or she) contributes to strengthening the
democratic institutions. However, this decision implies a nominal cost cr, which summarizes all
the costs related to mandatory voting, such as transportation costs or a ne for not attending to
voting.1 Conversely, if the individual decides to not be enrolled, then ri = 0. Thus, the budget
constraint in real terms that faces every individual is given by:
(2) xji + r
j
i  hji!
Where  = crpx is the real cost for being enrolled in the voter register and ! =
w
px
the real wage.
Regarding to citizen participation, the electoral roll, R, is composed by the sum of those parties
A and B's partisans that decided to be enrolled on (i.e., for whom ri = 1) plus those that decided
in the previous period to be enrolled.
Moreover, democracy, d, is treated as a public good, which means each citizen contributes to it
if he/she decides to be part of electoral roll and assume his/her civic duties. Hence, democracy is
a function of the electoral register, that is, d = f(R), where f() is a continuous, increasing, and at
least twice dierentiable function.
Therefore, each partisan i of party j must solve the following problem:
max
fx;l;rg
uji (x
j
i ; l
j
i ; d;m 1)
s.t.: xji + r
j
i  hji!
lji + h
j
i = 1(3)
R = (1  )R 1 +
nAX
k=1
rjk +
nBX
l=1
rjl = (1  )R 1 +RA +RB
d = f(R)
m 1 =
RA 1
RB 1
Where xji  0, lji ; hji 2 [0; 1], rji = 0; 1, R  0, d  0, and m 1 > 0.  is the mortality rate of
the electorate in each period.
The optimal values for x, l, h, and r can be obtained from the following equation:
(4)
@uji
@xji
=
1
!
@uji
@lji
=
1

@uji
@d
f 0(R)
Where
@uji
@xji
,
@uji
@lji
, and
@uji
@d are the marginal utility of consumption, leisure, and democracy, and
f 0(R) the partial derivative of f with respect to R.
1Krasa & Polborn (2009) evaluate the eects of assymetric voting costs (and information about candidates) and
subsidies over voter participation rate in a compulsory voting system.
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From a social perspective, suppose that a policy maker is seeking to maximize the common
good in this democratic society. Therefore, the problem that has to be solved looks as follows:
max
fx;l;r;dg
nAX
i=1
uAi (x
A
i ; l
A
i ; d;m 1) +
nBX
i=1
uBi (x
B
i ; l
B
i ; d;m 1)
s.t.:
nAX
i=1
xAi +
nBX
i=1
xBi + (R
A +RB)  !
 
nAX
i=1
hAi +
nBX
i=1
hBi
!
lji + h
j
i = 1(5)
R = (1  )R 1 +RA +RB
d = f(R)
Where xji  0, lji ; hji 2 [0; 1], rji = 0; 1, R  0, d  0.
The social solution implies the following condition:
(6) f 0(R) =


!
24 X
j=A;B
nX
i=1
@uji=@l
j
i
@uji=@d
35 = 
24 X
j=A;B
nX
i=1
@uji=@x
j
i
@uji=@d
35
The above condition yields the optimal values for x?i , l
?
i , h
?
i r
?
i , d
? y R?, from which can be
dened the following concepts. The voter registration rate, , is given by:
(7)  =
1
n
nX
i=1
r?i
The citizen participation rate, , is dened as follows:
(8)  =
1
n
nX
i=1
l?i
Finally, the optimal voter enrollment decision, rji , could be expressed by the following implicit
function:
(9) rji = r(!; ; l;m 1)
Thus, if the above expression is log-linearized and aggregated, then the following empirical
model can be stated:
(10) ln(i) = 1 + 2 ln(!)i + 3 ln(m 1) + 4 ln()i + 5 ln()i + "i
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2.2 The empirical model
The empirical study was focused on the Biobio region, Chile, considering its political-administrative
division (i.e., 54 municipalities) and gender approach. The data set was collected from Electoral
Service (SERVEL), National Institute of Statistics (INE), and National Socioeconomic Characteri-
zation survey (CASEN)2. From these data sources, a four-period panel was built for the years 2003,
2006, 2009, and 2011.
In order to compute the margin of victory, it was necessary to classify the votes from the
elections that took place in Chile during the period 2000-2011. Thus, the right-wing votes were those
collected by the political parties Renovacion Nacional (RN) and Union Democrata Independiente
(UDI). Those collected by independent candidates that signed a political pact with these two parties
were considered as rightist votes as well.
Analogously, the left-wing ballots were those collected by the political parties Democracia Cris-
tiana (DC), Partido Socialista de Chile (PS), Partido por la Democracia (PPD), Partido Radical
Socialdemocrata (PRSD), Partido Humanista (PH), and Partido Comunista de Chile (PC), and by
independent candidates that were included in a leftist pact.
It should be noted that the surages obtained by an independent candidate or member of the
Partido Regionalista de los Independientes (PRI) were not considered in the margin of victory's
computation. Finally, null and blank votes were excluded from the analysis.
Since the dependent variable (i.e., voter registration rate) is truncated in the interval [0,1] or
[0,100], then the empirical model was regressed using the corner solution approach3 in the form of
a two-limit random eects Tobit (2LRET) model that can be stated as follows:
(11) i;t =
8><>:
0 If rj = 0 for all j = 1; : : : ; n
voteregi;t If rj 6= 0 for some j
1 If rj = 1 for all j = 1; : : : ; n
Where it is the voter registration rate in municipality i at time t, rj the voter registration
decision of a citizen j that belongs to a municipality populated by n individuals, and voteregi;t is
given by:
(12) voteregi;t = 1 + 2lnwagei;t + 3margini;t + 4participi;t + 5ethnici;t + 6rurali + ci + i;t
Where votereg is the ratio between population enrolled in electoral register and adult population
(i.e., people over 17 years).4 The available information at SERVEL enables to build the male and
2The CASEN survey has been applied since 1985 by Ministry of Social Development, former Ministry of Planning
and known as MIDEPLAN, in order to retrieve information about the following modules: residents, education, labor
market, income, health, and housing. Moreover, it includes some emergent topics, such as wealth and ICT, disability,
poverty programs, ethnicity, migration, autobiography, and citizen participation.
3See Papke & Wooldridge (1996) or Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 16) for further details.
4Endersby & Krieckhaus (2008) discuss the consequences of using population as denominator when electoral
participation is computed.
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female electorate for each municipality included in the sample.
lnwage the natural logarithm of the average real income in Chilean pesos of 2009, which was
computed from the YAUTAJ variable collected in the CASEN survey.5
margin the margin of victory observed in the election immediately previous to the application
of CASEN survey. Therefore, in the estimation process were considered the 2001 Deputies election,
the 2004 and 2008 Mayor election, and the 2005 and 2009 Presidential election.
particip the citizen participation rate according to those activities listed in questions R18, T18A,
and R9 that were included in the CASEN 2003, 2009, and 2011 surveys, respectively. Since this
question was excluded from CASEN 2006 survey, then the gap was lled by its 2003-2009 average.6
ethnic the ethnicity ratio, where the ethnic groups recognized by the CASEN survey are aymara,
rapa-nui, quechua, mapuche, atacame~no, coya, kawaskar, yagan, and diaguita.
rural a dummy variable that takes value of one if a municipality is considered as rural based on
the criteria dened by OECD (2011) and zero otherwise. Finally, ci is the unobserved municipality
heterogeneity and i;t the idiosyncratic error.
In order to assess if the closeness eect depends on the type of election used in its calculation,
then the model was separately estimated for presidential and mayoral elections. In these regressions
the electoral roll was used as a weight for each municipality in order to isolate the electorate size
eect. From now on, the estimates from the weighted two-limit Tobit model will be denoted as
W2LT.
The empirical model estimated by W2LT is the same stated by equation (12). Nevertheless,
the following regression was ran when the margin eect was computed from the Mayor election's
outcome:
(13) voteregi = 1 + 2lnwagei + 3margini + 4participi + 5ethnici + 6rurali + 7indepi + i
Where votereg, lnwage, margin, particip, ethnic, and rural are dened as above, indep a
dummy variable which takes value of one if an independent candidate was elected as mayor in the
election immediately previous to the application of CASEN survey and zero otherwise, and i the
estimation error.
5This CASEN's variable considers the autonomous income for individuals and households and excludes any form
of subsidy from the government.
6See Ministerio de Planicacion (2003, 2006, 2009) and Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (2011).
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3 Main ndings and discussion
The results from the 2LFET and W2LT estimates are reported in tables 1, 2, and 3.
From table 1, it can be notice that the opportunity-cost of time, measured by lnwage, is a 1%
signicant determinant of voter enrollment in the Biobio region along with citizen participation rate
(particip). However, the coecient associated to this last variable is negative, which is contrary
to similar estimates reported for Chilean youth vote (Toro, 2007; Corvalan & Cox, 2013; Acu~na,
2013b).
[Table 1 about here.]
A remarkable result from table 1 is that linked to rurality. In fact, this variable explains more
than 10-percentage points of the voter registration rate in the female electorate, and this eect is
twofold for its male counterpart.
On the other hand, the closeness and ethnicity eects are not statistically signicant in the
three panels considered in the 2LFET estimation. Therefore, it seems that how tight or wide was
the election outcome in the Biobio region do not motivate to its citizens to attend to the enrollment
oces.
The estimated partial eect reported in brackets for real wage is negative and larger than that
estimated by Acu~na (2013b) for the young electorate. This result is coherent with the fact that
more than 75% of the electorate in the Biobio region was older than 40-years in 2011. That is,
older voters must face several responsibilities that demands more time in the labor market than in
others activities.
Motivated by the above results, it is interesting to assess if the closeness eect is statistically
signicant when is made a distinction in the margin of victory's calculation. In this sense, table 2
shows the W2LT estimates considering the rst-round and runo outcomes from the Presidential
elections of 2005 and 2009. Moreover, table 3 exhibits the results from the W2LT regression
considering the outcomes from Mayor elections of 2004 and 2008.
[Table 2 about here.]
The results depicted in table 2 indicate that the main determinants of voter registration rate
in the Biobio region are real wage, citizen participation rate, and ethnicity rate, all of them are
individually signicant at 5% level in the rst-round and runo estimates. From this table, it is
also peculiar that the empirical model exhibits a better performance for the year 2006 than 2011,
which could be enhanced through a panel data estimation if more election outcome episodes were
available at SERVEL.
The estimated marginal eects in brackets show that the eect of real wage over voter enrollment
is still negative and consistent with the \opportunity-cost of time" argument highlighted by Frey
(1971). Also, its magnitude is almost the same in the rst-round and runo estimates, but not
signicant in the regressions ran for the year 2011.
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The closeness eect is negative, as expected, but not signicant for all the 2006 regressions,
however, it is larger in the runo than the rst-round.
The citizen participation eect is now positive as reported by Chilean literature. This marginal
eect is larger for men than women, where the former has experienced a large reduction in its voter
enrollment rate.
The ethnicity (or racial) eect is signicant at 5% level and negative as reported by the classical
empirical literature, e.g., Silberman & Durden (1975). From the gender perspective, this partial
eect is greater for the male electorate, which could reorient a public policy that aims to increase
the civic involvement of indigenous population.
Table 3 shows the W2LT estimates for the voter registration rate in the years 2006 and 2009
after computing the margin of victory from mayoral election's outcomes. From this table, it can
be stated that the variables that encourage the voter enrollment in the Biobio region are the real
wage, margin of victory, citizen participation rate, and ethnicity ratio.
All the above variables are jointly signicant at 1% level in the estimates for year 2006, but
not for 2009 where citizen participation rate, ethnicity ratio, and rurality are the key variables
that drive the citizen's interest for being part of the Biobio region's electorate. This discrepancy
between the results from two distant periods could be indicative of a structural change in the
electorate during 2004 and 2011, however, this thesis requires a more comprehensive dataset to be
tested using the panel data approach.
[Table 3 about here.]
The estimated partial eects indicate that income eect is negative, signicant at 5% level,
and its magnitude is lower than the estimates from presidential elections. The closeness eect is
negative and signicant for the full electorate and its male counterpart.
The citizen participation eect is positive, signicant at 10% level, and lower for each electorate
in the 2009 regression, which corroborates that exists some kind of complementarity between elec-
toral and citizen involvement activities.
The racial eect is still negative and signicant, and its magnitude is lower than that reported
from presidential elections.
The rurality eect is only signicant for the whole and male electorates in the 2009 regression,
and lower than the 2LFET estimates.
Finally, it seems the fact that an independent candidate wins a mayoral election has no eect
over a larger voter enrollment rate in the Biobio region. Therefore, the left-right dichotomy in the
Chilean political system has left no room to a third party alternative, at least in the short run.
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4 Concluding remarks
The apathy for participate in activities linked to a democratic system shows an increasing trend
in Latin America that deserves the scholar community's attention. In Chile, the voter enrollment
rate exhibits a downturn after recovering its democratic tradition in 1989, which is disturbing in
youth vote (i.e., people ages 18 to 29). The Biobio region, which in 2011 concentrated the 13% of
the Chilean electorate, was no stranger to this reality. In this sense, this paper aimed to present
new evidence regarding to the relevance of two voter enrollment motivators, margin of victory and
opportunity cost of time, over the voter registration decision in the Biobio region during the last
decade. Thus, the following conclusions can be stated from the empirical test.
Estimates suggest that the main determinants of voter enrollment in Biobio are real wage,
citizen participation rate, and rurality if the margin of victory is computed from several political
elections. However, if the model is separately regressed for presidential and mayoral elections, then
the motivators of voter registration are real wage, citizen participation rate, ethnicity ratio, and
margin of victory.
The W2LT results are consistent with classical voting behavior giving fully support to the
opportunity-cost of time argument stated by Frey (1971) and the winning majority eect based on
the Downsian theory.
The real wage and closeness eects from W2LT regressions are lower in mayoral than in pres-
idential elections, which could be an indication that the electorate participates in dierent ways
depending on what is the political oce in question.
The citizen participation and racial eects are larger for men than women no matter what kind
of election was used in the margin of victory's computation. A fact that could be used in the design
of public policy that aims to encourage the civic involvement of male indigenous population in the
future.
Finally, the discrepancy between the W2LT results from two distant periods suggests a struc-
tural change in the Biobio electorate during the last decade. Nevertheless, the empirical test for
this hypothesis requires a more comprehensive dataset from SERVEL.
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Figure 1: Annual voter enrollment rate for Biobio region, period 2000-2011.
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Figure 2: Voter enrollment rate by municipality, Biobio region, years 2000 and 2011.
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Table 1: 2LFET estimations with margin of victory computed from several elections
Variables Full electorate Male electorate Female electorate
constant 3.4117 1.1901 3.3234
lnwage -0.2045 -0.0390 -0.1942
[-0.1761] [-0.0341] [-0.1695]
margin 0.0286 -0.0001 0.0536
[0.0246] [-0.0001] [0.0468]
particip -0.3759 0.0597 -0.6989
[-0.3236] [0.0523] [-0.6100]
ethnic -0.3130 -0.3526 -0.2232
[-0.2695] [-0.3088] [-0.1948]
rural 0.1321 0.2069 0.1295
[0.0987] [0.1450] [0.1002]
No. of obs. 212 212 212
No. of groups 54 54 54
Left-censored obs. 0 0 0
Right-censored obs. 37 56 30
F statistic 19.14 5.73 34.52
Log likelihood 127.72 119.01 102.62
Note: Partial eects in brackets. * 10% signicance, ** 5% signicance, *** 1% signicance.
15
Table 2: W2LT estimations with margin of victory computed from Presidential elections.
First round Runo
Variables Full electorate Male electorate Female electorate Full electorate Male electorate Female electorate
2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011
constant 3.6678 1.0405 2.4657 1.6491 3.1251 0.9307 3.4919 1.0660 2.8061 1.6478 2.8760 1.7911
lnwage -0.2444 -0.0368 -0.1540 -0.0779 -0.2058 -0.0287 -0.2323 -0.0347 -0.1807 -0.0784 -0.1872 -0.0868
[-0.2165] [-0.0363] [-0.1279] [-0.0726] [-0.1820] [-0.0283] [-0.2055] [-0.0341] [-0.1486] [-0.0731] [-0.1658] [-0.0851]
margin -0.1520 0.2488 -0.0466 -0.0609 -0.1490 0.4151 -0.1950 -0.3359 -0.2660 0.0335 -0.1286 -0.4650
[-0.1347] [0.2453] [-0.0387] [-0.0568] [-0.1317] [0.4102] [-0.1725] [-0.3302] [-0.2188] [0.0313] [-0.1138] [-0.4557]
particip 0.6916 0.1756 0.9412 0.2100 0.6481 0.0190 0.8026 0.2662 1.0680 0.1850 0.7072 0.0101
[0.6127] [0.1732] [0.7815] [0.1956] [0.5732] [0.0188] [0.7099] [0.2617] [0.8784] [0.1725] [0.6263] [0.0099]
ethnic -0.9864 -0.2352 -1.0871 -0.4775 -0.7884 0.0434 -1.0035 -0.3230 -1.1405 -0.4658 -0.7937 -0.0606
[-0.8738] [-0.2319] [-0.9026] [-0.4448] [-0.6972] [0.0429] [-0.8876] [-0.3175] [-0.9380] [-0.4344] [-0.7029] [-0.0594]
rural 0.0351 0.0211 0.0724 0.1593 0.0298 -0.0394 0.0302 -0.0008 0.0508 0.1626 0.0328 -0.0778
[0.0299] [0.0207] [0.0549] [0.1301] [0.0256] [-0.0392] [0.0259] [-0.0007] [0.0392] [0.1326] [0.0281] [-0.0771]
No. of obs. 52 54 52 54 52 54 52 54 52 54 52 54
Left-censored obs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Right-censored obs. 13 2 17 14 11 1 13 2 17 14 11 1
2 statistic 34.28 1.20 33.11 23.81 25.90 8.20 35.07 8.05 35.12 23.74 25.84 5.61
Log likelihood 15.84 27.10 5.79 7.01 14.37 25.94 16.24 27.13 6.80 6.98 14.34 24.64
Note: Partial eects in brackets. * 10% signicance, ** 5% signicance, *** 1% signicance.
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Table 3: W2LT estimations with margin of victory computed from Mayor elections.
Variables
Full electorate Male electorate Female electorate
2006 2009 2006 2009 2006 2009
constant 3.2644 1.6956 2.4694 1.7407 2.9041 2.0659
lnwage -0.2149 -0.0897 -0.1549 -0.0913 -0.1891 -0.1203
[-0.1936] [-0.0846] [-0.1332] [-0.0840] [-0.1676] [-0.1146]
margin -0.1482 -0.0173 -0.1866 -0.0005 -0.1143 -0.0163
[-0.1335] [-0.0163] [-0.1605] [-0.0004] [-0.1013] [-0.0156]
particip 0.8414 0.7586 1.0863 0.7021 0.7304 0.7105
[0.7580] [0.7159] [0.9343] [0.6456] [0.6474] [0.6771]
ethnic -0.9541 -0.9831 -1.0412 -0.9074 -0.7575 -1.0269
[-0.8595] [-0.9278] [-0.8955] [-0.8344] [-0.6715] [-0.9786]
indep 0.0072 -0.0595 0.0301 -0.0483 -0.0261 -0.0601
[0.0065] [-0.0575] [0.0251] [-0.0456] [-0.0236] [-0.0585]
rural 0.0407 0.0821 0.0704 0.0896 0.0316 0.0645
[0.0352] [0.0727] [0.0558] [0.0758] [0.0272] [0.0589]
No. of obs. 52 54 52 54 52 54
Left-censored obs. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Right-censored obs. 13 11 17 12 11 10
2 statistic 36.56 30.86 37.27 28.15 27.10 32.97
Log likelihood 16.98 18.85 7.87 15.46 14.97 21.09
Note: Partial eects in brackets. * 10% signicance, ** 5% signicance, *** 1% signicance.
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